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WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
Environmental Law-MINNESOTA ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT-In re
City of White Bear Lake, - Minn. -, 247 N.W.2d 901 (1976).
The Minnesota Legislature, in an effort to conserve and utilize best
the natural resources of the state, has declared that all waters which
serve a beneficial purpose are public waters subject to the control of the
state.' Any activity which may change the course, current, or cross-
section of public waters,2 therefore, requires a permit from the Commis-
sioner of Natural Resources.' The Commissioner's decision is directly
affected by the Minnesota Environmental Policy Act (MEPA),4 which
charges all state agencies with the responsibility to discourage ecologi-
cally unsound practices. 5 The Act provides that no permit for natural
resources management and development may be issued where the per-
mitted activity will cause pollution, impairment, or destruction of natu-
ral resources, if there exists a reasonable and prudent alternative.'
1. See MINN. STAT. § 105.38(1) (1976) (Minnesota Water Management Act).
2. "Waters of the state" is defined in MINN. STAT. § 105.37(1) (1976) as "any waters,
surface or underground, except those surface waters which are not confined but are spread
and diffused over the land."
3. See MINN. STAT. § 105.42 (1976) ("It shall be unlawful for the state, any person, .
to change or diminish the course, current or cross-section of any public waters, wholly or
partly within the state, by any means, . . . without a written permit from the commis-
sioner previously obtained.").
4. MINN. STAT. §§ 116D.01-.07 (1976) (Minnesota Environmental Policy Act).
5. MINN. STAT. § 116D.02(1) (1976) states:
The legislature, recognizing the profound impact of man's activity on the inter-
relations of all components of the natural environment, particularly the pro-
found influences of population growth, high density urbanization, industrial
expansion, resources exploitation, and new and expanding technological ad-
vances and recognizing further the critical importance of restoring and main-
taining environmental quality to the overall welfare and development of man,
declares that it is the continuing policy of the state government, in cooperation
with federal and local governments, and other concerned public and private
organizations, to use all practicable means and measures, including financial
and technical assistance, in a manner calculated to foster and promote the
general welfare, to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature
can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other
requirements of present and future generations of the state's people.
6. See MINN. STAT. § 116D.04(6) (1976), which states:
No state action significantly affecting the quality of the environment shall be
allowed, nor shall any permit for natural resources management and develop-
ment be granted, where such action or permit has caused or is likely to cause
pollution, impairment, or destruction of the air, water, land or other natural
resources located within the state, so long as there is a feasible and prudent
alternative consistent with the reasonable requirements of public health, safety,
and welfare and the state's paramount concern for the protection of its air,
water, land and other natural resources from pollution, impairment, or destruc-
tion. Economic considerations alone shall not justify such conduct.
Although "natural resources" are not defined in MINN. STAT. § 116D.01-.07 (1976), the
broad scope of this term can be seen in MINN. STAT. § 116B.02(4) (1976) which states:
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In the recent case of In re City of White Bear Lake,7 the Minnesota
Supreme Court was confronted with the issue of how Minnesota's envi-
ronmental protection and conservation policies should be applied to a
city's request to construct a roadway extension through the bay of a
lake. The City requested the permit to prevent a potential traffic safety
problem in a residential area, asserting that the proposed roadway
would relieve traffic congestion within the city limits." Work began on
the project in 1969 and continued until 1974, during which time approxi-
mately $50,000 was expended on plans and designs. In 1974 the City, in
compliance with the Minnesota Water Management Act, applied for a
permit to infringe on the lake.9 The Commissioner of Natural Resources
denied the City's request because the road extension would adversely
affect the lake and the adjacent wetlands and because other reasonable
and prudent alternatives had been presented which would have little or
no adverse environmental effect.'0
The City appealed the Commissioner's order to the district court,
which reversed, holding that the order was arbitrary, capricious, unrea-
sonable, and not supported by the evidence." The Minnesota Supreme
Court, in reversing the district court's decision, held that there was
substantial evidence in the record to support the Commissioner's find-
ings, and the fact that the City had expended a substantial amount of
money in preparation for the project did not require the project's ap-
proval. 2 More significantly, the court stated that the decision of the
"Natural resources shall include, but not be limited to, all mineral, animal, botanical,
air, water, land, timber, soil, quietude, recreational and historical resources."
7. __ Minn. __, 247 N.W.2d 901 (1976).
8. Id. at -, 247 N.W.2d at 902.
9. Id. at __, 247 N.W.2d at 901.
10. Seven alternatives to the City's application were proposed. Alternatives "V" and
"VII" would not encroach on Birch Lake, produce major adverse effects on wetland areas,
or increase traffic pressures on the existing residential streets. Id. at -, 247 N.W.2d at
905. The Commissioner's findings, however, revealed that the proposed roadway align-
ment would intersect or pass over 14 wetland areas. These areas were valuable because of
their water and nutrient retention, preservation of open spaces, and as wildlife habitat.
Additionally, the construction would downgrade the water quality of Birch Lake, elimi-
nating about 10% of the water surface area, and the roadway would act as a barrier to
wildlife movement, resulting in a substantial killing of wildlife. Moreover, chemical pollu-
tants would drain directly off the road without the benefit of wetland filtration. Id. at __,
247 N.W.2d at 905-06.
11. Id. at __, 247 N.W.2d at 903. The City raised the additional issue that the Water
Management Act had been amended in 1973 to broaden the definition of protected waters
which substantially increased the burden on a permit applicant. Additionally, because the
City had expended revenues on planning and designs prior to the amendment of the
statute, the City asserted that it had a vested right to the standard established by the
statute prior to amendment. The supreme court dismissed the issue finding that the Birch
Lake wetlands would have constituted protected public waters under either version of the
statute. Id. at __, 247 N.W.2d at 903-04.
12. Id. at __, 247 N.W.2d at 906.
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Commissioner was directly supported by MEPA, an act which has
drastically changed the state's environmental law.
3
The narrow issue presented in White Bear Lake was whether there
was sufficient evidence presented to the Commissioner to support his
denial of the permit to infringe upon Birch Lake." The decision, how-
ever, has much broader implications; for the first time MEPA was judi-
cially recognized as support for the decision of the Commissioner of
Natural Resources.
15
Generally, judicial review of administrative actions and proceedings
is limited in scope.'" The court's review usually is confined to questions
of whether the administrative agency has acted within its constitutional
or statutory powers, whether the agency's action is reasonable and not
arbitrary, or whether the agency's order is supported by substantial
13. Cf. County of Freeborn v. Bryson, - Minn. -, -, 243 N.W.2d 316, 321
(1976) (MERA) ("The remaining resources will not be destroyed so indiscriminately be-
cause the law has been drastically changed by the [Minnesota Environmental Rights]
Act. Since the legislature has determined that this change is necessary, it is the duty of
the courts to support the legislative goal of protecting our environmental resources.").
14. __ Minn. at __ , 247 N.W.2d at 904.
15. Id. at __, 247 N.W.2d at 906.
16. The scope of judicial review of administrative agencies is legislatively delineated in
MINN. STAT. § 15.0425 (1976) which states:
In any proceedings for judicial review by any court of decisions of any agency
. . . the court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for
further proceedings; or it may reverse or modify the decision if the substantial
rights of the petitioners may have been prejudiced because the administrative
finding, inferences, conclusion or decisions are:
(a) In violation of constitutional provisions; or
(b) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency;
or
(c) Made upon unlawful procedure; or
(d) Affected by other error of law; or
(e) Unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record
as submitted; or
(f) Arbitrary or capricious.
See United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11, 76 (D. Minn.) ("Minnesota
Court decisions unanimously share the judgment that the judiciary has extremely limited
review authority in permit matters delegated to state agencies, and that the judiciary will
not assume the functions of the agencies."), modified on other grounds, 490 F.2d 688 (8th
Cir.), motion for stay of injunction granted, 498 F.2d 1073 (8th Cir.), successive motions
to vacate stay denied, 418 U.S. 911, 419 U.S. 802, 420 U.S. 1000 (1974), modified on other
grounds, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975); Markwardt v. Water Resources Bd., __ Minn.
-, 254 N.W.2d 371 (1977) (citing MINN. STAT. § 15.0425 (1976) as the appropriate scope
of judicial review); Gibson v. Civil Serv. Bd., 285 Minn. 123, 126, 171 N.W.2d 712, 715
(1969) ("The functions of fact-finding, resolving conflicts in testimony, and determining
the weight to be given to it and the inferences to be drawn therefrom rest with the
administrative board."); Mitchell Transp., Inc. v. Railroad & Whse. Comm'n, 272 Minn.
121, 130, 137 N.W.2d 561, 567 (1965) ("[Qluestions of fact and of policy are for adminis-
trative and not judicial determination.").
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evidence. 7 In White Bear Lake, the Commissioner's denial of the permit
was challenged as not based on sufficient evidence."8 The proper test for
establishing sufficiency of the evidence is whether the order is based on
substantial evidence."0 If the evidence presented in the record reason-
ably supports the agency's decision, the reviewing court cannot over-
turn the agency's decision."0 The Minnesota court found this substan-
tial basis was present in White Bear Lake, and it therefore upheld the
decision of the Commissioner denying the permit."
The significance of White Bear Lake is the judicial recognition of
MEPA, which requires the Commissioner to refuse the issuance of any
permit when environmental damage may result. The current environ-
mental movement in Minnesota was launched in 1971 by the adoption
of the Minnesota Environmental Rights.Act (MERA) ,22 which provides
individuals with grounds to challenge in the courts private and govern-
mental activities that adversely affect the environment.23 In the initial
test of MERA, County of Freeborn v. Bryson,21 the statute was given a
liberal interpretation, with the court holding that MERA could be in-
voked to restrain the exercise of the state's power of eminent domain to
take a portion of the plaintiff farmer's land. 25 The passage of MERA
17. See MINN. STAT. § 15.0425 (1976).
18. - Minn. _, -, 247 N.W.2d 901, 904 (1976).
19. See, e.g., Minneapolis Van & Whse. Co. v. St. Paul Terminal Whse. Co., 288 Minn.
294, 180 N.W.2d 175 (1970) (substantial evidence rule applied through the statutory rule
governing the scope of judicial review, MINN. STAT. § 15.0425 (1976)).
20. Id. at 299, 180 N.W.2d at 178 ("if the evidence is conflicting or the undisputed facts
permit more than one inference to be drawn, the findings of the commission may not be
upset"). See generally 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 29.01-1 to -8
(1976) (review of current tests).
21. - Minn. at -, 247 N.W.2d at 906.
22. MINN. STAT. §§ 116B.01-.13 (1976). For a comprehensive analysis of the Act, its
legislative history, and its operation, see Note, The Minnesota Environmental Rights Act,
56 MINN. L. REV. 575 (1972).
23. MINN. STAT. § 116B.03(1) (1976) states in part:
Any person residing within the state . . . may maintain a civil action in the
district court for declaratory or equitable relief in the name of the state of
Minnesota against any person, for the protection of the air, water, land, or other
natural resources located within the state, whether publicly or privately owned,
from pollution, impairment, or destruction.
24. 297 Minn. 218, 210 N.W.2d 290 (1973).
25. Id. at 227, 210 N.W.2d at 296 ("[Wle conclude that the legislature intended in
appropriate cases that the power of eminent domain possessed by the governmental subdi-
vision . . . was to be limited by the provisions of the [Environmental Rights] [Aict.").
The Bryson decision has been hailed as the first judicial affirmance of a statute confer-
ring standing on individuals to oppose the state's eminent domain power when that
power is exercised through a political subdivision. The eminent domain power of the
state itself is not affected by the Bryson decision. See Comment, Eminent Domain and
the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act: A Shift in the Balance of Power, 9 URa. L. ANN.
237, 237, 244 (1975).
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ended an era during which the power of eminent domain was indiscrimi-
nately used to further economic and social needs at the expense of the
environment."6
In 1973, the legislature enacted MEPA," imposing directly on state
agencies the duty to protect against environmental destruction.28 The
Commissioner of Natural Resources is now required to evaluate each
application for a permit to determine if there will be an adverse environ-
mental effect.2 9 A determination of adverse effect and the showing of a
feasible alternative will cause the permit to be denied.10 The applicant
can rebut the Commissioner's decision by showing the public impor-
tance of the project outweighs the environmental considerations and
there are, in fact, no reasonable alternatives."' Under MEPA the burden
26. See County of Freeborn v. Bryson, - Minn. -, -, 243 N.W.2d 316, 321
(1976) ("Until the Act was passed, the holder of the power of eminent domain had in its
hands almost a legislative fiat to construct a highway wherever it wished."). Prior to the
amendment of MERA in 1971, the power of eminent domain was exercised with few
restraints and minimization of costs was the paramount concern. However, with the
enactment of MERA the power of eminent domain has been severely limited and environ-
mental factors have taken precedence over social and economic factors. Compare State
v. Christopher, 284 Minn. 233, 170 N.W.2d 95 (1969) (decision of the Commissioner of
Highways to condemn 22 acres of park for freeway construction was upheld by the Minne-
sota Supreme Court because the route was the most convenient and least costly of all
alternatives), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1011 (1969) with In re City of White Bear Lake, -
Minn .... 247 N.W.2d 901 (1976) (request for infringement upon a lake for highway
construction denied because alternative routes existed).
27. Act of May 19, 1973, ch. 412, 1973 Minn. Laws 895 (codified as MINN. STAT. §§
116D.01-.07).
28. See MINN. STAT. § 116D.03(2) (1976).
29. United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11, 76 (D. Minn.), modified on
other grounds, 490 F.2d 688 (8th Cir.), motion for stay of injunction granted, 498 F.2d 1073
(8th Cir.), successive motions to vacate stay denied, 418 U.S. 911, 419 U.S. 802, 420 U.S.
1000 (1974), modified on other grounds, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975) states as follows:
The statutory procedures proscribed by the legislature for water permit matters
may be summarized as follows: The Commissioner is delegated specific author-
ity to use his discretion, within broadly defined statutory guidelines, to utilize
the state's police power to protect the public interests. The Commissioner must
take certain factors such as public safety and welfare into consideration and if
he doubts that they will be protected he can deny the permit.
30. An agency determination that a permit should not be issued should contain at least
three elements of proof: (1) that the environmental resource is protected; (2) that there is
pollution, impairment, or destruction of the protected resource; and (3) that there is a
feasible or prudent alternative course of action. See MINN. STAT. § 116D.04(6) (1976). The
last of these elements, "feasible and prudent" alternatives, has been analyzed under
MERA as requiring a dual standard. Initially, under MERA, "feasibility" is characterized
as the absence of a better technological method of carrying on the desired activity. Addi-
tionally, "prudent" alternatives are those which are economically reasonable in light of
the social benefits derived from the activity. See Note, supra note 22, at 599-600; Note,
Highways, Environmental Legislation, and Judicial Review: The Changing Notion of
Necessity, 50 N.D.L. REv. 483, 497 (1973) (discussion of the environmental effects of
highway placement and the legislative measures taken to protect the environment).
31. See MINN. STAT. § 116D.04(6) (1976).
[Vol. 4
5
et al.: Environmental Law—Minnesota Environmental Policy Act—In re City o
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1978
RECENT CASES
of proof on the applicant is significantly increased because no longer can
the applicant receive a permit by merely proving that the desired activ-
ity is less costly and environmentally disruptive than the other alterna-
tives.3" Under MEPA, the applicant must now prove all alternative ac-
tivities are unreasonable. It is possible, therefore, had the City of White
Bear Lake applied for the permit prior to the adoption of MEPA, that
the permit may have been granted because the Commissioner had the
authority to approve any reasonable permit regardless of the environ-
mental effect 3
MEPA is patterned, in part, after the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA), 4 passed by Congress in 1969. A federal statute similar to
Minnesota's was interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in
Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,3 5 a case strikingly
similar to White Bear Lake, where the Court applied environmental
policies to resolve a conflict between the protection of natural resources
and the placement of a highway."5 In Overton Park the Department of
Transportation argued that its Secretary had the discretion to under-
take a wide-ranging review of economic, social, and environmental fac-
tors to determine whether to allow the construction of a freeway through
a park.3" The United States Supreme Court held that NEPA did not
grant the Secretary such wide-ranging discretionary powers. The Court
32. See note 26 supra.
33. This position assumes that no action would be brought under the Minnesota Envi-
ronmental Rights Act, MINN. STAT. §§ 116B.01-.10 (1976).
34. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970). See No Power Line, Inc. v. Minnesota Environmen-
tal Quality Council, No. 48014 (Minn. Sup. Ct. Sept. 30, 1977). The Minnesota Act
adopts the general policy and goals of NEPA almost verbatim. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 4331
(1970) with MINN. STAT. § 116D.02 (1976). Twenty states and Puerto Rico have adopted
legislation similar to NEPA. See 2 F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 9.07
(1977); Hagman, NEPA 's Progeny Inhabit the States-Were the Genes Defective?, 7 Urn.
L. ANN. 3 (1974).
35. 401 U.S. 402 (1971). This case required the construction of two federal statutes, both
of which required the Secretary of Transportation to refuse funding for any environmen-
tally disruptive program which would require the use of publicly owned land and for which
a feasible and prudent alternative land use was available. The requirements placed on
the Secretary are almost identical to those placed on the state agencies under the Minne-
sota Environmental Policy Act. Compare 23 U.S.C. § 138 (Supp. V 1975), as amended by
Act of May 5, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-280, § 124, 90 Stat. 440 and 40 U.S.C. § 1653(0 (1970)
with MINN. STAT. § 116D.04(6) (1976).
Subsequent federal court decisions have broadly interpreted the term "use" under 49
U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970), finding that encircling or bordering on protected park property
is a use under the statute. See Colton, The Case for a Broad Construction of "Use" in
Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act, 21 ST. Louis U.L.J. 113 (1977).
36. 401 U.S. at 411-12. The Secretary of Transportation approved federal funding for a
six-lane interstate highway through a 342-acre park in Memphis, Tennessee. The plaintiff
citizens committee asserted that circumventing the park was a reasonable and prudent
alternative and, therefore, the federal funds should not have been approved.
37. Id. at 411.
38. Id. The Court found that the reasonable and prudent exemption would only apply
6
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agreed that because people do not live in parks, a highway routed
through a park is the most direct, least costly, and least disruptive of
all alternative routes.3" However, the Court found that the standards for
permit approval were more than a mere balancing of the economic,
social, and environmental factors. 0 In finding that environmental pro-
tection was to be afforded preference over economic considerations, the
Court stated:"
The very existence of the statute indicates that protection of parkland
was to be given paramount importance. The few green havens that are
public parks were not to be lost unless there were truly unusual factors
present in the particular case or the cost or community disruption
resulting from alternative routes reached extraordinary magnitudes. If
the statutes are to have any meaning, the Secretary cannot approve the
destruction of parkland unless he finds that alternative routes present
unique problems.
The same "paramount importance" under federal law is afforded the
environment under the Minnesota Act, where Minnesota's Act states:
"Economic considerations alone shall not justify such conduct.", 2 Addi-
tionally, in White Bear Lake, the court denied the permit despite the
City's forceful argument that the new highway route across the lake
would drastically reduce traffic congestion in the city. 3 The announced
state policy to favor environmental resources was implemented by the
White Bear Lake court to give environmental interests priority over the
social needs of the local community.
MEPA signals the beginning of a new era of increased protection for
natural resources. All state agencies are presently required to evaluate
all state action and, when damage is found, to initiate actions to prevent
further diminution of natural resources. Minnesota, therefore, through
MEPA, has taken affirmative action to insure that all natural resources
will be protected in the future.
if it would be feasible, "as a matter of sound engineering," to build the road along another
route. Id. See also note 30 supra.
39. 401 U.S. at 411-12.
40. Id. at 412. See generally 2 F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW §§ 9.01-.07
(1977).
41. 401 U.S. at 412-13 (emphasis added).
42. MINN. STAT. § 116D.04(6) (1976); see Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst, - Minn.
- . 256 N.W.2d 808, 841 (1977) ("As we construe the statutes, and apart from
statute, if there were substantial evidence that ... [the proposed action] at Mile Post
7 would have significantly adverse medical effects on the residents of Silver Bay, no
further consideration would be given to the economic consequences of a total shutdown
and the site would be rejected.").
43. - Minn. at -, 247 N.W.2d at 907.
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